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SEAL visionary LCDR D.Wilbourne and Commodore of
SBR-1 CMDR Thomas S. Tollefson developed The Special
Operations Crew (SOC) concept and put into effect
Sept 1981.
The SOC were formed, and trained to deploy on short
notice with a SEAL Platoon, its mission to provide
the tactical support and liaison to SEALs while
embarked on Indigenous craft. They will liaison on
Host Nation naval craft insuring accurate
navigation, Insertion of SEALs, communications, and
tactical support and extraction of SEALs to insure
the successful completion of the Mission, When the
host nation has no armed maritime assets, The SOC
will operate local indigenous craft, be it local
fishing boat, pleasure craft, water taxi, tug boat
etc, etc.
28 Sept. 1981 CMDR Tollefson signed the instruction
establishing the Special Operations Crews for
Special Boat Squadron One and directed its
subordinate units, SBU-11, SBU-12, and SBU-13 to:
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Train qualify and
equip and have SOCs ready for deployment.
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SBU-11 was to
stand up 3 Active duty SOCs and 5 Reserve SOCs
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SBU-12 was an all
active duty unit and was to stand up 5 SOCs
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SBU-13 was to
stand up 2 active duty SOCs an 5 SOCs
The SOCs never gained
the authorized full strength as there was just not
enough 9533 boatguys to fill these billets and other
SBU tasking. A basic SOC was made up of a Officer or
CPO and 3 enlisted made up of the following rates,
BM, QM, GMG, EN, ET. Two SOCs could be combined for
larger craft.
Before being considered for SOC you had to be fully
qualified 9533 NEC boatguy, a first class swimmer
and SERE school in your record. Because of the high
risk and sensitive nature of the mission the SOC
were screened and only the best chosen for the
assignment. The new SOC instruction was received as
a mandate and SOCs were formed, and rapid
deployable, weapons, comms, navigation, engineering,
and electronic repair gear was identified and
earmarked for SOC ops.
The concept of using Indigenous Craft in Special
Operations is not new. Historically its as old as
man took to the sea, and the classic examples are
17th century Privateers. The concept was widely used
by the British in WWII and also used in Korea and
covertly in Cuba in the early 60s and Vietnam as
well.
However by 1980 the concept was a lost art with the
exception of veteran SEALs. So armed with the SBR-1
SOC instruction the SEALs re-invented the wheel
again and drove home the ideas and techniques into
the brains of the SOC using Indigenous craft of the
area. The concept is really Good Common Sense. An
SBU Combatant Craft, stealthy well armed and blacked
out if spotted by the enemy its still a Military
boat. However an Indigenous craft common in the area
sighted by the enemy may take no notice and may be
able to slip in and conduct its mission.
The Boatguys designated SOC entered a new dimension
of maritime covert operations. All west coast units
stood up SOC teams active and reserve based on
availability and operational commitments.
SBU-12 with it's all active duty with commitments to
NSWU-1 in Subic and ARGs, They could not have
separate SOC's as dets, so the MST det "wore two
hats", both MST and SOC and received extra SOC
training to their MST training. SBU-11 the riverine
unit in Mare Is. stood up and had strictly dedicated
SOCs both active and reserves as they had no
overseas commitments. They had a great operational
area, enlisted SEALs as part of their SOC and they
were commanded by a veteran SEAL CPO.
SBU-13, its actives, formed into a SOCs but only as
a collateral duty. Its reserves formed two SOCs
completely dedicated to SOC operations. From 1981 to
1984 SOCs trained, operated, and often used as
aggressors in exercises in CONUS. Some SOCs deployed
without ever using its special skills, some did
deploy as SOC and had interesting operations.
With the much touted new C-141 air deployable SEAFOX
becoming the main Rapid deployment asset by 1984,
the SOCs fell from favor. There were other problems
when SOCs Officers complained they lost their best
men from their boats to SOC and enlisted grumbled
only the SOCs get fun training and cool ops. The
griping from officers and enlisted could have, but
wasn't, handled by keeping the Unit informed on how
SOC fit into the SBU as just another deployable
asset.
The SOC faded from
SBU history for years. The SOC concept had laid
dormant for years when it was resurrected by SBR-1
Commodore CMDR Gary Stubblefield under the new title
of Tactical Operations Crew (TOC), but with the same
mission and concept. Oddly enough the SEAFOX by this
time was a worn out lemon to NSW. The new TOCs
performed just as well as the earlier SOC and was
growing in readiness when in 1990 Desert
Shield/Storm came along and the TOC concept was not
immediately used in the war. The concept was being
studied and considered by Capt Ray Smith C.O of NSWG
TG in Desert Shield when the land war kicked off and
100 hours later the war was over. The TOC was given
another chance in 1992 to the SBU-13 reserves but
never had a chance to develop as SBU-13 was
dis-established in 1993, and once again faded into
history.
Despite the problems within a command about
effecting morale, the concept of using Indigenous
Craft conduct NSW operations remains tactically
sound. |