The Tactical Operations Crew (TOC) at
SBU-13 1990
by
Phil G. Garn
San Pedro Harbor was hazily quiet
at two in the morning, but not completely still. The
cabin cruiser, Crazy Baby, idled forward
gradually creeping along side an out bound coastal
tanker steaming toward the outer harbor. Inside the
old pleasure boat, a swimmer pair fixed the
anti-tampering devices to the limpet mines then
finished donning their re-breathers, drawing the
first draughts of rubber flavored air. As the tanker
crawled by the Coast Guard Station at Reservation
Point, the grubby crew men of its little shadow
helped the divers slip quietly off the stern to
disappear into the dark green harbor with barely a
ripple and no tell tale bubbles. Crazy Baby
kept pace with her outbound screen as a second cabin
cruiser, Dauntless, five minutes behind,
shadowed along with an outbound party boat, speakers
still droning old rock tunes in the thick marine air
and disco lights flashing bright ,though the
revelers aboard had lost most of their steam.
Dauntless used the flagging party boat as
Crazy Baby had used the tanker to screen her
from the patrolling watch at the Coast Guard Station
guarding the two big cutters moored pier side. She
dropped her frogmen as quietly as her lead motoring
out into the outer harbor.
In less than an hour, the two
cabin cruisers had slowly circled around to the
extraction point on the other side of the Coast
Guard station where they received a brief light
signal from the swimmer pairs. Each boat slowly
idled in for the pick up. Crazy Baby hardly
shifted into neutral as the crew helped pull the
camouflaged swimmers from the water, spiriting them
below decks. The cruisers slowly motored away
gradually disappearing into non-descript berths of
large civilian marinas. The operatives moored the
cabin cruisers among hundreds of other pleasure
boats and walked off in their sloppy civvies
carrying away their high tech com-gear and other
military equipment in big bright Coleman coolers to
their comrades waiting in a Ford Econoline and a
Chevy Blazer, just some guys coming back from a
fishing trip. They drove away from the marina into
Long Beach well before dawn.
Neither taken from a contemporary thriller nor
plucked from headlines of a recent Al Qaeda attack,
this was an exercise conducted by the Special Boat
Unit (SBU) 13 and 12 Tactical Operations Crews (TOC)
in August of 1990 against civilian and military
targets in Long Beach and San Pedro. The only
fictional aspect depicted above was the swimmers
fixing anti tampering devices to the limpets, as the
mines were inert training devices. In less than two
days after the limpeteer attack on the Coast Guard
Cutters at Reservation Point, this MARDEZ operation
which had already included successful tactical
waterborne and land infiltrations, contacting
friendly agents, employing civilian craft to conduct
harbor reconnaissance was canceled before more
training missions were attempted as the all active
and reserve Special Warfare men received an
emergency call to return to the Naval Amphibious
Base (NAB) in Coronado. Back in the compounds at
NAB, Special Boat Squadron One (SBR-1), SBU-12 and
SBU-13 scrambled to prepare to deploy their active
components to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation
Desert Shield which later became Desert Storm. While
the exercise was only partially complete, the SBU-13
Reserves again validated several Special Forces
concepts. This piece attempts to explain from my
point of view why and how the Tactical Operations
Crew (TOC) evolved from the Special Operations Crew
(SOC) concept in the 1980's and what was
accomplished by the command and men with an emphasis
on the Reserve side of the house at SBU-13.
Historical Background
For centuries, navies and military forces around the
world have used civilian small craft to accomplish a
wide variety of clandestine military missions from
agent and special forces infiltration/ex filtration
to re supply and casualty evacuation to intelligence
gathering to mine laying to patrol and interdiction.
One of the most spectacular raids of World War II
(2) was carried out from a former
Japanese fishing boat that sailed from Australia
thousands of miles behind the lines to conduct a
canoe born limpeteer attack in Singapore Harbor and
return after destroying a number of ships with out a
loss. The British also supported numerous commando
attacks as well as guerrilla re-supply missions and
gathered intelligence in Aegean with a large
flotilla of schooners or claques (3) as
well as some motor launches and PT type boats. Nor
has America been a stranger to these practices, from
the pre-Revolutionary War period (3) to
the 21st Century, American naval forces have
successfully employed everything from birch bark
canoes to sailing junks (4) to support
military objectives and gather intelligence. However
despite this long history of success, there is an
inherent resistance to the un-conventional in the US
military with a precipitous peace time decline in
capabilities followed by a mad scramble and repeated
re-invention of the wheel in war time.
The post Vietnam era was no different than any other
period in our history. After honing skills in battle
and building an huge array of small craft-some of
which were quite effective, the US Navy downsized
dramatically, cutting coastal and riverine forces to
the bone [For more detail about the Boat Units
during the period between Vietnam and Desert Storm,
see the author's: “Sparks in the Wilderness”
(5)]. During this period, the Navy
focused on a major conventional/nuclear Eurocentric
conflict where the nuclear submarine and anti
submarine warfare were primary, carrier aviation was
secondary, amphibious capability was behind that,
and coastal/riverine forces were at the bottom along
with naval gun fire support. At that time, Naval
Special Warfare was itself a bastard child and only
the desire to have organic boat support kept Naval
small combatant skill alive, in effect the bastard's
bastard. If conventional small craft were the
bastard's bastards, then even the even more exotic
use of naval crews manning civilian craft for
military missions received even less support,
despite centuries of evidence to the contrary.
However, being Naval Special Warfare, commanders
knew a greater variety of clandestine missions had
to be considered. Therefore Special Operations Crews
(SOC's) were established in the Special Boat Units
In 1981.
SOC Concept
The SOC crew was supposed to be able to man and sail
"indigenous" craft to support clandestine missions.
This was in units where over 50% of the assets were
used to support infiltration and ex-filtration
behind on hostile shores or clandestine beach
reconnaissance prior to sea bore assaults. The most
common conception for the SOC was infiltrating and
exfiltrating a SEAL squad using some sort of native
craft for a near shore raiding mission. How this
craft was obtained was never clear, and there was
not a lot of formal thought beyond supporting a
traditional waterborne infiltration/ex filtration of
a SEAL, Marine Recon or Green Beret raiding team.
Within each command, commanders identified sub units
for SOC missions. For active units such as SBU-12
which supported a forward deployed detachment (Det)
in Subic Bay and Seafox Crews which were deployed
with Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG's), the SOC's were
typically a subsection of the Subic Det where the
best coxswains, navigators, gunners mates, engineers
and electronic techs were pre-selected and
designated SOC's; while for the ARG Det which
consisted of a three man crew for the deployed Sea
Fox, these three were it. For reserve units such as
SBU-13, personnel were again designated from the
most experienced crew men in the unit. For more on
SOC in SBU-13 see Jim Gray's excellent article on
SOC (6).
Demise of the Reserve SOC at SBU-13
Shortly after the SBU-13 SOC successfully deployed
to Korea, completed a number of training missions
and it seemed like the concept was just getting up
on step, the rug was pulled out from under the SOC
at SBU-13 for a variety of interrelated reasons. The
primary was lack of understanding from both active
and reserve command components. A paucity of
qualified Officers and Petty Officers in Charge (OIC's
and POIC's) to man the command's conventional boats,
65 foot Sea Specter Mk III's, (PB's), PCF's (Swift
Boats) and Seafoxes (Special Warfare Craft Light)
was another significant contributing factor.
After the Vietnam War, there was a tremendous
turnover of both active duty officer and enlisted
personnel in the Boat Units (unlike the SEAL
community, combatant crewmen [now Special Warfare
Combatant Crewmen [SWCC's] were not yet closed
looped) which caused a cyclical drought of
experience. Funding was also cyclical, typically
boom but mostly bust, which also worsened things
along with white elephants like the Special Warfare
Craft Medium (SWCM also know as the "Sea Viking" or
derisively as the "Sea Brick" which never reached
the SBU and ended her days as a target hulk at the
cost of millions.) Many SEAL officers had no prior
Boat Unit experience other than as passengers, and
many Surface Line officers had no prior Special
Warfare experience. In this unit, junior officers
and even petty officers were not only in command of
their own craft but running difficult sensitive
missions which were quite different than the highly
structured orderly drill of the fleet. This was a
big concept for many to get their heads around.
Likewise, the boats were far more complex than the
re breathers, small arms and parachutes that SEAL's
were used to and the surface fleet had a much
different mentality than the Teams. Just as CO's and
XO's learned the missions and trusted the crews,
they were rotated to new assignments, likewise the
active duty components of POIC's and engineers (they
key personnel that you needed to keep the boats
underway during the working week to support a
variety of Special Warfare training missions as well
as for the reservists during drill weekends) could
be decimated in a matter of months as key men were
rotated out to the fleet. It also took a long time
for the new actives to trust the reserves. The
feeling was if these reservists were such good
sailors why did they leave active duty and how could
they possibly have any sort of "real" experience.
The primary missions of clandestine infiltration and
extraction behind enemy lines, well ahead of the
fleet or the Marines, and the skills and mindset to
accomplish these type of Special Warfare missions
were foreign enough along with the "special craft"
the Navy provided. That one would have to conduct
these complex missions with a leaky bonka boat,
trawler, junk, or a sail boat was even more
incomprehensible to many. If god forbid, it came to
that, the attached SEAL element would certainly do
the dirty work of ship/boat takeover. It was hard
enough just to man the missions with the command's
Seafox and PB crews much less spare anyone to crew
non- existent indigenous craft.
Finally, there was also quite a bit of jealously.
The men (officer and enlisted) who typically were
the most successful in the boat units tended to be
enthusiastic, risk takers who embraced the
unconventional and pushed the envelope. To the
established fleet type (active and reserve), this
ran completely contrary to the deep water doctrine
and far outside their comfort zones especially in
peace time where the parade ground, PMS (preventive
maintenance system) and administrative inspection
were more important than true combat readiness. Not
only did the achievers successfully complete their
missions but routinely excelled even when major
systems went down, such as ordinance, electronics or
engines. However, they also tended to flaunt their
successes, which added to their aura, but made the
timid and unfamiliar even more uncomfortable and
resistant. The push back was if you want to be a
"wild Indian" go to BUD/S and become a SEAL. And so
the SOC was suppressed for about 6 years.
Return from the Gulf and Rebirth as
Tactical Operations Crew
Battle was the impetus for the resurrection of SOC.
As the majority of the Navy prepared for a Tom
Clancey-esque showdown with the Soviets and Warsaw
Pact (7), a small portion of the
Squadron's active and reserve men were in the
Persian Gulf in series of hostile actions during
Operation Earnest Will 1987-1989. Not only were
active and reserve personnel from the Boat Units
deployed, but the SBR-1 Commodore, Commander Gary
Stubblefield, a SEAL combat veteran from Vietnam,
was in the thick of it with his men. They
experienced first hand the Iranian's using
commercial civilian boats conducting clandestine
mine laying, the Iran Ajar, small boat
attacks and surreptitious intelligence gathering
from converted dhows. In addition to re-igniting a
martial spirit, they brought back usable battle
trophies like the IRGB (Iranian Gun Boat) and
Boghammer (Swedish speed boat) as well as placing
the captured Soviet bloc AA guns from the IRGB in
the compound as a monument. In addition to the
Commodore at Squadron, other experienced actives
were appointed to leadership roles at SBU-13, LCDR
Judge Coniff (who had done a tour at SBU-12) as CO
and Ops Officer Lieutenant Tom DeNio. In addition to
the experience on the active duty side, reserve Gulf
vets, like then Senior Chief Jim Gray (also a
Vietnam Vet boatguy and ‘the go to guy” then at
NSWGroup 1), GMG2 Brian Eschbaugh and EN1 Robin
"Mac" McKinney infused everyone with enthusiasm and
recent battle experience. There was also finally a
depth of reserve OIC's and POICs then Lt's Bob
Koerber, Chuck Marks and Steve Andy who would all
become future CO's of the reserve component as well
as hard chargers like Lieutenants Jason Kessell,
Bill Gray, Mark Bauer and then QM-2 Tom Folkesson
(Now a chief and perhaps the “Senior Corsair”
Reservist at Special Boat Team-12) and the
incomparable Lt. Steve Walter. It was time to bring
back the SOC, but the Commodore wise enough not to
open old wounds dubbing this new group the Tactical
Operations Crew (TOC).
A Dream Team
Aside from then Lt. Steve Walter, who was the "Bull
Ensign" at SBU-12 when I arrived in 1984 and had the
most Boat Unit experience of any Officer in the
command at the time 1988-89, I had the most Spec War
experience in the reserve ward room and had just
come off a period as reserve Operations Officer at
SBU-13, so was lucky enough to be selected as the
OIC of the TOC. What was even more thrilling was my
assigned crew, which showed the Squadrons' and
Commands' commitment to the mission. Though I had a
large number of superlative shipmates in both SBU-12
and SBU-13, these guys were beyond outstanding
sailors. Additionally, they all had special
capabilities that I think illustrate the added
potential of the reserves.
GMG2 Brain Eschbaugh 9533 NEC OIC Qual was both the
epitome of a "boat guy" and TOC crewman, not only
did he have a lot of fleet experience but was a
master at ordinance and waterman in his own right.
On Civy street, he lived on a classic wooden cabin
cruiser that he restored with his family, and ran a
boat repair business which additionally was doing
contract work for the Navy repairing SEAL and Marine
Zodiac's. Brian also had volunteered for the Det in
the Persian Gulf, but later would volunteer for
other Dets and special projects including evaluating
the RIB's (ridged inflatables) in Kodiak, Alaska and
the HSB's (High Speed Boats). Cool and experienced
in any situation with plenty of small arms and crew
served weapons experience, he was far beyond
outstanding.
EN-1 Robin "Mac” or “Rob" McKinney 9533 NEC OIC Qual
was way beyond what you could ever expect for a
chief engineer. Mac had a ton of experience in the
fleet and in the boat unit, but in his civilian job
he repaired all kinds of engines and equipment for
the Los Angeles County Fire Department. He was used
to repairing a variety of broken machines quickly
even with the most rudimentary tools and could
improvise nearly anything on a dime in a flash. Like
Brian he also had volunteered for a number of dets
and special projects, as well as being an
accomplished scuba diver, sky diver and crack shot.
Mac also had quite a library of PT and Spec war
books and learned a lot on his own. We had also
operated together for several years in the boats.
HM-1 Dale "Doc" Kyle. 9533 NEC had served as a
corpsman with the Marines in Vietnam and was also a
real doc in civilian life not only 9 to 5 Monday to
Friday but also volunteering on humanitarian
projects in backward places like rural Mexico. There
was no question he would keep you alive. He had been
underway in SBU-13 for years on a variety of ops to
boot. If there was any potential for injury he and
HMC Jim "Doc" Greenough (an old SOC crewman) had
been all that stood between us and the grim reaper.
As adventurous and enthusiastic as any of us, Doc
was the most mature and steadying influence. His
suggestions often made operations run more safely,
ruffling the least amount of official feathers.
QM-2 Tom Folkesson 9533 NEC OIC Qual was a first
rate navigator and like Brian had lived on a sail
boat. He had years of experience in the boat unit
and had been on several ACDUTRA's (reserve training
missions) with me including up to the sloughs of
Sacramento River Delta kicking SBU-11's. Tom like
Mac and Rob would become Chief's in their respective
rates and would do a number of special projects at
the unit then and now in the Special Boat Team (I
believe at the time of this writing, March 2008, he
is the senior Corsair at SBT-12.) It is hard to
describe Tom because he was just such an easy going
natural with great good humor and just fit right
in.
MM-2 Steve "Smitty" Smith 9533 NEC could literally
make anything. He was a master machinist and in his
civilian life worked for a ship yard. I cannot
believe the number of hours he put in at the ship
yard on a variety of projects. For relaxation he
shot skeet and trap. His natural sense of humor
always kept things light, and he could talk his way
into and back out of anything.
MM-2 Marty Chiri 9533 NEC was a solid teammate and
the most skeptical of all of us. If he could be
persuaded, it was going to work.
Lt. Bart Taylor was one of those Surface Line
officers who took to Special Warfare like a fish to
water. He was an enthusiastic rag hauler (sail
boater). With his recent fleet and active duty
experience he was up on the latest terminology and
programs of the day.
These are the crewmen that you want: experienced,
improvisers, enthusiastic, daring and level headed
with an added maturity hard to find in peace time.
|
1.
Brian
Eschbaugh and I going up to MARDEZ
tactical insertion.
|
|
 |
2.
Final
Hooyah Ambush: Doc Kyle M-14, Me
M-16/203, Marty Chiri M-60E, Steve
“Smitty” Smith M-60E and Bart Taylor
M-14 (Left to Right Top to Bottom).
Brian Eschbaugh took the photo, so is
not depicted and both Tom and Mac had
been detached to PB crews. Note the SWCL
in the background.
|
|
 |
3.
Tom Folkeson, Rob Mckinney, Brian
Eschbaugh, Phil Garn
|
|
 |
Missions, Doctrine ,Equipment and
Techniques: Reinvention and Discovery
Certainly Americans and other countries' sailors had
been running maritime
unconventional warfare missions for centuries, but
there were no readily available contemporary
specifics and the official concept/tasking was
rather vague: using “indigenous craft” to support
Spec War missions. Somewhere there might have been
operational orders and detailed post-operational
reports, with lists for load outs and lessons
learned like in the Boat Units and Teams, but we
never saw these. Also remember there was a six odd
year hiatus between the SOC and the TOC and no
overlap between crews (Just connections to Jim Gray,
Doc Greenough and Steve Walter as well as the old
boy network), so we had to start developing
missions, techniques, and test equipment to see what
worked and what did not all in a period when there
was not a lot of official funding. Nor did we have
assigned craft (an old sail boat or trawler perhaps
government seizures from DEA or Customs were only a
future dreams). The Boghammer and IRGB and to some
extent the Setton and later Fountain HSB’s were the
only non-traditional craft in the Squadron and they
were regulated pretty much like our PB’s and Sea
Foxes with crew qualifications being needed and
husbanded by the active side of SBR-1 and SBU-12 who
did not typically work on the weekends when we
drilled. I and others would go on our own time for
SBU-12 final battle problems out at San Clemente
Island to gain more experience.
We
started with the basic premise of conducting any
traditional operation we would with our own craft (PB's
and Sea Foxes at the time) such as clandestine
infiltration/exfiltration and beach reconnaissance
as well as less traditional missions such as mine
laying, clandestine re-supply, civilian/military
evacuation, fire support and intelligence gathering
with craft ranging from skiffs to fair sized
commercial fishing trawlers. We knew that anything
larger than a small coastal freighter was going to
be beyond our skill set and ability of 8 guys to
maintain. Simply put, we needed to move shoot and
communicate, but be highly mobile. We had turn what
ever “indigenous craft” we got our hands on into an
effective platform and keep it running for the
entire mission.
Our initial thoughts were what can we pack into para-bags
to turn our "indigenous craft" into effective
platforms. Cruise boxes and connex boxes would come
later when we gained experience. So we thought about
our basic requirements: medical, navigation,
mechanical, communications and weapons. A big part
of our initial solutions were people not
equipment. Professional reading was another huge
element, and we read a lot as individuals trying to
glean nuggets from what the British, OSS, Axis and
others had done. Never underestimate the lessons
learned found in published works, but we more often
found small nuggets versus detailed outlines and
instruction.
Medical: Here we were well ahead of the boat units
and to a big extent the Teams with Doc Kyle's real
world experience both military and civilian. He was
also putting together an official medical bag, but
had outside resources which really brought his
capabilities more up to date. A number of us had
lifesaving and first aid experience, and Doc was in
the process of bringing us all forward.
Navigation: Tom was a first rate QM and had
celestial down. Bart also had this and my old skills
could be brought up to speed. Though like Brian and
Mac, I had a very good sense of “Voodoo Navigation”,
which is dead reckoning plus good sea sense. Despite
this DR and accumulated experience, Tom was always
keen for us to spell out precisely where we were
going and the effects tides currents and other
conditions would have along the entire track to the
whole crew. We all knew the more local knowledge we
had the better off we would be. We all also had been
well indoctrinated into Spec War's mission planning,
so the more info the better. Note below how we
approached our operations in Long Beach Harbor doing
physical recons months in advance in addition to the
chart and table work.
Mechanical: We knew we had to keep it light, you
cannot pack a drill press or a lathe in a parabag,
so we needed first rate improvisers. Mac's practical
engineering knowledge was beyond impressive.
Certainly he could fix the standrd Navy engines with
standard tools, but he also had a wide breadth of
experience repairing a wide variety of fire fighting
equipment and could improvise. He also had some
small tool bags which had served him well on many
previous training missions with the PB’s and Sea
Foxes. Likewise, Smitty could fabricate anything
with next to nothing. With fine tools he could
create fine tolerances, but he could adapt something
that would get us through the op. Chiri could also
get right in there and make it work. Not to mention
Tom and Brian's experience living on and restoring
boats. Jury rigging was what we knew we would need,
and we had this skill set. This was critical as
Murphy’s Law was always in effect and even more so
with unknown “indigenous craft”.
Weapons: We were all pretty much weapons crazy, and
Brian was a first rate Gunners Mate. However, we had
a very limited official arsenal, M-16, M-14, M-60,
870, M-79 and M-203 with various pistols, as well as
.50 cals, MK-19's and mortars. You need to remember
that one of the drills at SBU-13 was putting all the
parts of an M-2 .50 cal, M-16 and M-60 in a bucket
and assembling each weapon on the clock (Thanks GMCM
Leroy Grezkowski). LAAWs were also something that we
hardly ever got to fire, but would be abundant if
the balloon went up, just like Stingers which we got
to play with at the Teams (just old tubes). The
Teams had MP-5's and MAC-10's and other weapons
which we would not likely have access to, especially
the suppressed ones. We also knew we would be very
restricted as to what we would be able to load out,
so many of us had our own guns, which we would have
used had we gone into combat, such as tuned .45's
and my trusty CZ-75. We never shot enough, but we
were all decent shots and were always seeking more
training, see CQB below. We also came up with a
great break contact/firepower weapon a SAW (M-249)
with an M-203. It should be remembered that it was
against policy (by the know-it-alls) to combine the
M-203 with the CAR-15 at this time, but many Team
armorers did it anyway on deployments, just
re-configuring the weapons when they got back to
NAB.
Communications: This was a very weak area for us.
Not only because we were working with Vietnam era
portable equipment like the venerable PRC-77 and
there was not much of it, but we did not have a
really super ET/Com wizard like then ET-1 Jeff
Hunter who had recently transferred to SEAL Team
1,3,5. What Mac was to engines and Doc was to
bodies, Jeff was to electronics. Not only was our
portable com gear primitive but we also did not get
a lot of practice with IFF, coding or crypto much
less calling in fire missions.
There was a lot more to do, and we had to experiment
with a lot of things particularly on our own using
our own resources and money on our own time. Some of
the things we were playing around with were portable
reverse osmosis water filters (then just becoming
available at REI), life and load bearing vests (this
was when all life vests were blaze orange, even
Sterns and the load bearing vests with fastex and
Velcro were still experimental even for the Teams.
Brian was doing a lot of sewing and Bart and I
bought some surplus Israeli and South African
equipment). We used our own portable canoes. Aside
from Rodger's Rangers and many others using Indian
canoes from colonial times, the British (SBS
[Special Boat Squadrons/Sections], Royal Marines,
COPP’s [Combined Operation Pilotage Parties] and OSS
used canoes, more of what we would call kayaks to
conduct insertions and extraction's, limpetter
attacks and reconnaissance from World War II through
the Falklands and beyond [the Rhodesian SAS used
them in Rhodesia and the Recces used them in South
Africa]. This was a great method of insertion with a
small boat that was highly portable. We used my
Klepper Aries II and Brian's inflatable Zodiac (this
was an experimental design developed by Zodiac in
France not on the commercial market) on several
occasions to give our Sea Fox crews and our selves
practice with rendezvousing and challenge and reply.
We also practiced with the IBS (Inflatable Boat
Small), the canoe could go longer and faster just as
silently as the IBS. Though the IBS had a greater
load carrying capacity and in some situations more
stability. Here again, we knew we could not always
rely on SF operators to get us to were we needed to
be or take over the “indigenous craft”, so we
developed ways to sneak us into the target area.
This was a very much a period of re-discovery,
experimentation and improvisation as well as
developing doctrine and procedure while we trained.
Training
I
am going to describe three types of training
evolutions which should help illustrate how the team
operated formally and informally within the team,
command, Squadron and out side the Squadron. The
first is the classic sail training in San Diego Bay,
the second is Close Quarter Combat (CQB) Training
with Reserve Seal Team 1, 3, 5 and finally operation
MARDEZ 90 in Long Beach.
In
the days of turbocharged diesels, jet drives,
counter rotating surface piercing props even for
fishermen and pleasure boaters, the prospect of
hoisting a sail and using the wind to sneak into or
out of danger seems quite remote. And to the
conventional deep water Naval man or commander, sail
training seems like an excuse to goof off on the
"G". However, there is little better way to
experience how the forces of nature influence one at
sea than sailing a small boat. On a sunny day in a
small boat, mother nature is a lot more forgiving.
Wind is critical to movement and tides and currents
have a much more pronounced effect at the slower
speed of sail. Sailing promotes awareness and
develops physical and mental coordination. This
experience gives one a feel for the water and a
variety of conditions that translates well
especially when running special operations at very
slow speed, which is how most Spec War missions are
run, not at Mach 5 (until things go very wrong).
Handling even a single sail and tiller can be far
more complex than a wheel and throttle. Of course
there was also the romantic notion of having to
pirate a sail boat, after losing one's own craft;
though using a sail on a life raft or Zodiac was
more likely.
Naturally one of the first evolutions we came up
with was sail training. Our first outing was on the
bay with pretty simple one man rigs like a Sunfish
(Laser?) and a Hobbie Cat. Some of the crew were
experts like Bart, Tom and Brian. With their
patience and encouragement, they were able to get
the rest of us back up to speed or at least able to
sail out and tack back with out tipping over by the
end of the day. We all had a much better idea of our
own capabilities and were more confident. We also
wanted do more. And yes, it was pretty fun. This is
an example of what we were able to do completely on
our own with our own personal private resources
(8).
CQB
One of the most astonishing training exercises I was
involved with in SPECWAR came about through "the old
boy" network. One of my house mates in Coronado was
then Lieutenant Duncan Smith who was a reserve at
SEAL Team 1,3,5. Three of the guys at 1,3,5 (Ken
Good, Dave Maynard and Mick Volpe) were instructors
at the Navy's Shipboard Anti Terrorist School over
at 32nd Street and came up with a proposal to train
the SEAL reserves on the latest close quarter battle
techniques (CQB) as well as practice ship boarding
during an upcoming drill weekend. Duncan explained
that his guys had a short course where they taught
sailors and Marines how to organize an
anti-terrorist unit for their command to be able to
re-take their ship or command in the event of a
terrorist takeover (this was in the late 1980's to
1990's). The course consisted of class room
explanation of tactics, marksmanship at the range
with standard weapons M-16's, M-14's shot guns and
.45 pistols then a simulated exercise with paint
ball guns on an old ship pier side at 32nd Street
Naval Station. In 1990, paint ball guns were quite
rudimentary and were not in wide spread use as
training tools for the military or civilian law
enforcement. Duncan cleared it with his chain for us
to participate, and I got permission for my TOC to
attend. That was how the deal was done with out a
lot of paper work.
We
all met at 32nd Street. While the SEAL squads
started practicing ship boarding on the side of the
old training ship using telescoping painter's polls,
rope ladders and other techniques; we got condensed
lessons on room clearing. Then the instructors
walked us through clearing spaces, ladders and
passageways inside and outside the old ship. We got
better as we went along, rehearsing the basics
moving through different sized passageways to rooms
and machinery spaces. The keys were violence of
action and deliberate coordinated movement. Dave and
Ken told us that often one guy would be able to take
out a room full of sailors or Marines armed to the
teeth through violence of action and marksmanship
alone.
Platoons began to follow us on the walk throughs and
then it was time for the paint ball exercise. The
objective was to start from the open rear deck and
work your way forward clearing spaces and engage any
terrorists you found along the way to secure the
bridge. We got to go first, suited up with goggles
and bolt action paint guns (which were pretty new at
the time) then moved forward using the tactics we
had just learned. Things seemed to be going OK, then
bang! we started taking fire. Ken Good had one of
those high speed semi-automatic guns and started
picking us off one by one. Once you were hit, you
went back to the start line to watch as the rest of
your team continued with the exercise. I think Brian
and Mac were the last two left getting theirs up
near the bridge. Though we had not reached our
objective and were smarting from the sting of the
paint balls and their obvious stains, we were really
excited and keen to try again. We thought the
lessons Ken, Mick and Dave had taught us had been
thoroughly reinforced.
The SEAL's who had been watching us, lined up for
their turn with a little of that now we'll show you
guys how its done swagger. The first squad lined up
and moved out into the exercise making their way up
an exterior ladder on the port side. Ken did not
just pop out and take a couple of shots as he had
with us then disappear behind cover. He moved
smoothly and deliberately through the squad
dispatching them completely in a matter of seconds.
Everyone watching was stunned. The paint did not
lie, clear splatters center of mass on every man,
and Ken was unscathed. The second squad did not last
much longer. Our jaws were on the deck, one guy had
just completely wiped out two squads not in the
confusion pipes of the engine room or tight confines
of a tricky space either; also these were not just
some young Marines or sailors who were thrown
together for a training course but SEALs in assigned
squads, a number of whom were combat vets from
Vietnam. Needless to say we were all paying complete
attention and everyone tightened up even more as the
drills continued. (9)
TOC practice with Paintball guns CQB
on the White River
|
 |
The White River, this decommissioned
ship was a training platform for SEALs and TOC. note
Toc working up the stb side of ship.
|
 |
MARDEZ CENCAL 90
The third example was a major CSBR-1 organized
training evolution which included not only us
(SBU-13 TOC) but elements of SBU-12, CSBR-1 and Seal
Team squads as an orange force to test harbor
defenses in Long Beach, MARDEZ SENCAL 90. The
premise was a foreign country, very loosely based on
a rabid version of Norieiga's Panama which was
trying to de-stabilize the United States by
smuggling large quantities of drugs and strike hard
at law enforcement targets. We, Spec War, were
pitted against the US Coast Guard, Navy including
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) group, DEA,
US Customs, LAPD, Long Beach Sheriff's Department
and Long Beach Harbor Patrol and brought
considerable assets to the Exercise.10).
During our April 1990 drill weekend, Lt. Tom DeNio,
our Op’s officer, gave us a heads up of possible
participation in this exercise. Over the next two
months Tom gave us more information and in July, I
began liaison with Lt. Bret Kuykendall from SBR-1
Operations Department and received an informal
tasking from our CO, LCDR Judge Coniff. We had
further coordination meetings with Orange force
continued on July 21 and 31. Finally in August, we
got our formal tasking from Commander Coniff. Our
formal objectives were as follows:
1. Tactical Infiltration
2. Rendezvous with Coast Guard
Auxiliary (CGA) craft and crews
3. Insert/Extract SEAL combat
swimmers for a limpeteer attack on the
Coast Guard Cutters at
Reservation Point.
4. Conduct water born
reconnaissance of Blue Forces.
5. Simulate waterborne drug
smuggling
6. Insert/extract SEAL operators
on an assault of on the MIUW site
7. Insert/extract SEAL combat
swimmers on two additional limpeteer attacks.
8. Tactically Ex filtrate.
As
soon as Tom DeNio told us what was in the wind, we
began planning and looking at the operational area.
In July, we did an onsite reconnaissance in civvies
with video cameras of the Long Beach/San Pedro area
from the shore (here again these were our personal
video cameras). We got a first hand and fresh look
at nearly everything and were able to match features
up with the charts, which is what Al Qaeda would
copy a decade later with chilling effect (11).
On
August 1, 1990, we got our orders along with Lt.
Sprat from SBU-12 and his TOC team. We divided up
missions and assets. Then the next day we drew our
gear which was exclusively communications and night
vision equipment then began our final preparations
and rehearsals which included a swimmer insert.
SBU-12 TOC Lt Jack Spratt and his
Setton HSBs get ready to get under way from ASDV
while a PBMKIII is moored behind them
|
 |
What we had planned for our SBU-13 TOC was to divide
into two elements, a road team consisting of Bart
Taylor, Doc Kyle, Steve Smith and Marty Chiri who
would drive sterile vehicles (Clean civilian
vehicles with our personal gear) through the San
Clemente Check Point on Interstate 5, and the Water
Team, Brain Eschbaugh, Mac McKinney, Tom Folkesson
and me heading up to Dana Point by Sea Fox and
inserting by water with our military gear. Again,
this was right before Pelican cases came into wide
spread use in Spec War, so everything was wrapped in
layers of Hefty plastic bags and lots of 500 mile an
hour tape (green duct tape) and a few items in
Coleman coolers, easier to tow with fins.
At
1545, our road crew dropped us off at Pier 14,
before swinging by admin. to pick up our travel
checks and drive to our rendezvous at Dana Point. We
got a late start at 1630 and were on our way for
Dana Point by Sea Foxes. However, there was a small
fire on one of the Sea Foxes, so we headed back to
Pier 14. At 1900, our road crew was waiting at Dana
Point while we were getting ready to get underway
for the fuel pier at Point Loma. In the days before
wide use of cell phones (which were as large as shoe
boxes), there was no way to communicate
instantaneously, so we left a message with the
command calling from a land line at the fuel pier.
So when our guys called in for a sit rep at the
command, they knew they were going to have a long
night. We finished refueling at 2155, then headed
north.
The next morning at 0130, we flashed our signal
light to our road crew at the secondary infiltration
point in the harbor and got the correct reply.
Cammied up, we went over the side with the gear,
side stroking and kicking to the shore. We pooled up
and sent our swimmer scout in on the final leg. He
linked up with the road crew, then signaled us in.
We signaled to our Sea Fox that we were "OK", then
there were liberty turns for NAB. All I can remember
was the water was bracing when we first went in and
the parking lot was nearly empty, which was good as
we stripped off our sopping cammies and threw
everything into the back of the cars. In a flash,
we were headed north to the safe house.
This was actually Mac's home. Emily, his wife, was
as cordial and supportive as a better half can be
when the boys roll in at 0330 and the kids never
stirred or more importantly, woke us up. We hauled
in the gear and sacked out all over the floors in
the McKinney house, after setting a proper watch of
course.
At
1000, we had reveille then turned to cleaning and
preparing the equipment. Not surprisingly and
fortunately for us, all the radios and night vision
worked and there was not a drop of water damage. By
1200, we were on our way to our first rendezvous in
the Wilmington area of Long Beach/San Pedro.
Promptly at 1400, we met with the crew of the
Crazy Baby , a classic cabin cruiser, at the
Wilmington Pier per our plan. I have got to say that
you could not have asked for a better group of
friendly agents than the US Coast Guard Auxiliary (CGA).
Rather than foot noting their professionalism,
patriotism or seamanship it needs to be said right
up front that these men and women were the zenith.
Their boats were well maintained, they had
tremendous local knowledge and Maritime experience
as well as enthusiasm and can do spirit. The bottom
line was they were Americans who were completely
trustworthy and ready to play the game. They were an
outstanding group to work with and far beyond what
you would expect to be provided by an outside agency
or even your own choice. Never-the-less, we still
had a plan to take control if things went wrong(12).
Within 15 minutes, Alpha Team (Garn, McKinney,
Folkesson and Smith) was loaded, and we began
planning our first operation briefing with our CGA
crew. However just after we left the dock, we
realized Bravo crew had Mac's gear. So it was back
to the pier to RV (rendezvous) with Bravo. At 1910,
we were under way and headed out through Angels'
Gate clearing the breakwater at 1945.
Between 2000 to 2040, we began some gentile evasive
maneuvers to shake a boat we thought was following
us. These were just subtle changes in course and
speed not a panicked dash or pronounced high speed
zig-zagging. As it turned out it was our SBU-12
brothers following us in the Dauntless. We
transited out to Point 1A to rendezvous with the
ASDV (13) and were on station promptly at
2100. We then radioed and learned that the ASDV was
well behind schedule and were told to return at
2330. Fifteen minutes shy of this rendezvous,
Commander Coniff radioed us and told us to head
south to
meet the ASDV at Seal Beach some miles to the south.
We changed course and met with the ASDV a quarter
after midnight, got our swimmer pairs and their
gear, then headed back to Long Beach.
At
0215 we maneuvered slowly into position between an
outbound tanker which we used to screen our
insertion. Ten minutes later, we dropped the swimmer
pair from the stern at about 5 knots near the
Southern point of the US Coast Guard station and
continued to motor up the channel out into the
harbor. The Dauntless started her run at 0240
screened by a party boat (as related above) dropping
her pair five minutes later, then signaling the
observers by shining a spot light directly into
their faces. We slowly motored to the extraction
point an laid up until about 0315, when we gently
herded a crew boat away which was cutting across the
swimmer recovery operation. (We needed to protect
our swimmers but also did not want to call attention
to what we were really doing.) Alpha team completed
recovery of our swimmer pair by 0330. Five minutes
later, we transferred LTjg Sebenaler and his swim
buddy then called our Bravo team to meet us back at
the dock. We were pierside at 0355 and attempted to
call Commander Coniff, but had no success. At 0420
we left the dock and headed to the new safe house
(hotel) giving a blow by blow description to our
Bravo guys detailing how things had gone. We
formally debriefed about 1500 and checked in with
Commander Coniff testing our communications but
found neither our VHF or HF radios were able to
communicate between safe houses (Hyatt and Holiday
Inn). We debriefed the skipper over beers at a
restaurant getting into the Spec War way back
machine along the way (14).
On
August 6, we checked in with Commander Coniff and
SBU-12 TOC. Then left to rendezvous with PAR-X-ALLANCE
for Bravo crew’s first mission at 1135. While they
were getting underway, we got to tour 42 and 82 foot
Coast Guard Cutters and get a look at a 110 footer,
which we had attacked the previous day.
Bravo was underway at 1145 and began reconnoitering
the MIUW site which stuck out like a sore thumb with
military vehicles, giant tents and a tall radar mast
in plain sight with no attempt at camouflage. The
crew on PAR-X-ALLANCE also got a good look
at the Coast Guard Sea Rider (RIB) and 82 ft Cutter
stationed at the harbor's entrance noting positions
and routines. They evaded inspection by slowly
heading to the bait barge and let the Coasties go on
by. At 1530 the USCG Point Evans stopped the
PAR-X-ALLANCE who was identified by the White
Forces (referee) in her distinctive Coast Guard
uniform and white hat (which she declined to remove
[15]). Bravo got a pass as the Coasties
could not find any of their equipment (had we had
quite a bit and weapons would have been no problem,
if had we had them). Bravo continued with their
reconnaissance spotting a Sheriff's boat near the
oil islands (oil platforms modified to look like
tropical islands).
That evening, Bravo rendezvoused with a 22 foot
Bayliner owned by PAR-XALLANCE's skipper CGA
Captain Smith in Huntington Harbor at 1830.They
continued their reconnaissance locating two Harbor
Police boats then evaded boarding by a 42' cutter
deftly cutting behind a tanker at 1930. Again these
maneuvers were slow and subtle not crazy Hollywood
mad dashes. Bravo continued to chart CG and Harbor
Police assets and patrols then briefed Commander
Coniff before securing and returning to the hotels.
When we woke up the next day and checked in with our
area command, we learned Commander Coniff had been
recalled and was on his way to the compound at NAB
as some sort of situation was developing in the
Middle East. We went over and helped the PAR-X-ALLANCE
crew with repairs (16).Throughout the
morning information spiced with rumor and much
speculation trickled in with plans constantly
changing. At first, it seemed we (Squadron Command,
SBU-12 assets and SBU-13 TOC) would continue with
the exercise including more limpeteer attacks
scheduled for that evening. Then SBU-12 was being
pulled out by bits and pieces, and we heard some
element of the command was going to the Persian
Gulf. Later in the morning we linked up with the
SBU-12 TOC at their hotel, The Golden Sails, about
noon. They were clearly packing up and going to be
driving south within fifteen minutes. LT. Brett
Kuykendall, who was all that remained from Squadron
Ops, told us to pack up and return to the compound.
We
took our sterile transport back to our hotel packed
up and checked out, then went to our safe house (the
McKinney's) and collected the gear we had staged
there and drove down the road stopping for dinner
along the way. Naturally we were disappointed at not
being able to finish the mission especially as we
were succeeding and to our minds clearly kicking
ass, but very excited with what we had accomplished.
We also speculated a little about the situation in
the Gulf and thought it would be fairly similar to
the previous campaign. The PB's from both SBU-12 and
SBU-13 would be loaded up as deck cargo, the actives
would be in the initial deployment and later on
there would be a call for Reserve volunteers.
Pulling into the compound at 2230, we were astounded
by the activity. The HSB's (17) were
trailered, Connex boxes were all over the Squadron
and Boat Unit compounds and men from all three
commands were rushing about with cordage,
chancellery, electronics and weapons. Checking in
with Lt. Tom DeNio, he brought us up to speed: the
CO was gone! not at home getting gear ready but on a
flight East. In fact, he had been so busy that the
command had to mail his side arm and we would not
see him until the end of the war. The initial plan
was to deploy the top actives from all three
commands SBU-12, SBU-13 and Squadron in that order
of personnel contribution with all of the
air-deployable boats (HSB's) new ridged inflatables
(RIB's) then start getting the PB's (65 ft Sea
Specter Patrol Boats) and Sea Foxes ready to go.
Because there would be a little time before deck
space would be available on merchant shipping, the
reserves would be able to use these larger craft at
least for the rest of the ACDUTRA period.
On
August 8, Mac and Tom Folkesson were split off from
the TOC and integrated into PB crews. We were all
pitching in to get the commands' deployed and
everything flyable to North Island. There was a
virtual air bridge with a stream of C-141's and
C-5A's landing and taking off night and day. Across
the strand at the Teams, everything was in the same
state of turmoil. Secret weapons were coming out of
vaults, and guys were building palates for clothes
washers and dryers for air loading. Every truck in
Spec War was shuttling back and forth from NAB to
North Island and guys pitched in where ever there
was work to be done. The SBU-13 TOC would have one
final mission before ACDUTRA ended, but back to the
MARDEZ.
The next day, I got the word that I would be
representing the Squadron at the hot wash up for the
exercise up in Long Beach on August 10. This was a
great honor for me but also shows you how serious
the real world situation was. Commodore Jon Wright,
Commander Coniff and Lieutenants Tom DeNio and Bret
Kuykendall had put forth a huge effort over many
months just to get us into the operation, and now I
was not only representing Squadron but Naval Special
Warfare Group 1 (NSWG-1) as well. I had my notes and
collected what I could from Lt. Brett Kuykendall and
Lt. Spratt for my presentation.
On
the morning of the 10th, I drove up to Long Beach in
my personal truck for the hot wash-up (debriefing
the exercise) at the conference room at the top of
the Union Bank building in down town Long Beach. In
my nearly medal and ribbon free khakis, I rode up
the elevator to the big board room which had a
spectacular view of the harbor and surround. In this
opulent corporate setting full of 0-5's and 0-6's
and high ranking civilians, I think I was the only
0-3. The admiral began round table introductions. We
then got down to the briefing, which was in essence,
what had we (Spec War done) because they honestly
did not know. After a brief explanation of why I was
representing NSWG-1, I out lined our proposed
objectives, then described what we had accomplished
including how the HSB's had gotten the simulated
drug loads over the break water. The room was
astounded and wanted to know how we had "done it."
To paraphrase my Company Officer from OCS, CWO-4
Wally Exum, for the next hour "I was the movie": It
was all just run of the mill Spec War stuff,
thorough recon, lots of mission planning, trusting
our cammie and training, daring and keeping cool.
Final Hooyah
After we had packed up and sent off our actives and
the little boats, we had a bit of time before our
ACDUTRA ended, and the freighters arrival which
would take away the PB's and the rest of the Sea
Foxes which had not been airlifted. The TOC's last
mission was to ambush the PB's as they entered
Oceanside Harbor. We were able to put into use the
patrol tactics Duncan Smith and SEAL Team1,3,5 had
taught us with a load out of weapons Tom and I had
seen on earlier operations with the reserve SEAL's
against SBU-11 [heavy on the 7.62 versus 5.56 with
M-14's, M-60's (18) and I had trusty a
M-16/M-203.] We used pop flares to simulate LAAW
rockets.
Again, we inserted by Sea Fox, quickly disembarking
and scrambling over a chain link fence in side the
military side of the harbor. I think one of the 60's
hit the dirt rather hard on the other side of the
fence. But we quickly formed up in our diamond
formation, patrolling to our objective at a fair
walking pace. We were fairly lucky as we were never
challenged by the Marines or any security personnel,
as we circled around to the other side of the
military harbor. Just acting like you know what your
doing goes a long way.
On
the South side of the harbor entrance, we deployed
and set our ambush then waited until we could
literally see the whites of their eyes as the PB's
throttled back to enter the harbor. I initiated the
ambush with a flair from the M-203 and we opened up
with the blanks literally from point blank range
with the PB's in the choke point. They returned fire
and powered into the harbor, not hesitating in the
ambush area. I don't think we were extracted until
the next morning and that was our final hooyah!
Deployment and DESERT SHIELD/STORM
At
our end of ACDUTRA picnic on Gator Beach, we (the
TOC) were told that we would be forming up a reserve
deployment to relieve the actives. The plan was for
an activation order (call up) in late October or
early November with a work up from that time to the
beginning of the year for a turn over with the
actives who already there. The TOC would be
providing the back bone of this Reserve deployment.
From the first Gulf deployment on the Barges in
1987/1989, Squadron had found that the deployed men
lost effectiveness at about the four month period
based on the tight confines of the barges.
Through August and September there was a mad on and
off schedule. One week we were at the Teams filling
out our wills and completing pre deployment
paperwork with the Seals then the next there was
rumor that we might not go. By the end of September
we were down. The XO told me they were only going to
call up a few of the enlisted men to man the
compound, paint the pier, and not even the TOC crew,
but guys who were equipment operators and other
ratings. And that was how it was. It was a major
disappointment to the Reserves who invested years in
their unit only to be “backfilled” at best. You have
to remember that these were highly, motivated
working professionals, who put in a tremendous
amount of non-paid time, not just collecting an
extra check or education benefits. The Army Special
Forces has no such “backfill policy” and their
reserves have served with distinction. In the
current Global War on Terror with man power
shortages particularly in Special Operations, it is
hard to imagine turning away trained patriots or
maintaining corporate knowledge. However right after
a war there seems to be an overflowing amount of
fresh combat experience, but in the inevitable draw
down, it is the reserves who have the corporate
knowledge and can flesh out and/or create additional
units.
Never the less, the actives did a magnificent job
during the war, which are a series of stories for
another time. As a result not only Spec War but the
Boat Units re-established the significance of the
community and maritime unconventional warfare
missions. Almost over night, funding appeared as did
new craft, some of which were steps forward like the
MK-V and the big RIBs (and others were steps
backward like the PC). However, most importantly the
Special Boat Community was finally closed looped for
enlisted men and the units grew.
Analysis of Renaissance
During this brief period in the late 1980's to the
Gulf War, men of the Special Boat Units again
demonstrated some of the possibilities available to
unconventional warfare in training exercises for the
real world as well as the élan, innovation and can
do spirit which as characterized the American
unconventional warrior. The drive, patriotism,
eagerness and hooyah has always been there; sadly,
many of the lessons must be re-learned again and
again at great cost due to narrow mindedness and
lack of vision at the top. It is only with support
from the highest quarters that this hard won
experience does not fade, having to be literally
re-invented by succeeding generations of American
Fighting Sailors in time of war.
End Notes
1.
TOC Insignia: Having seen a number of private
purchase unofficial SPEC WAR unit patches from the
Vietnam era and current subdued emblems, I thought
about a TOC operator patch for our underway training
uniforms. I wanted a design which was simple and
conveyed the mission, the men, small boats and
unconventional warfare. After sketching out all
kinds of combinations of anchors, propellers,
tridents, flint lock rifles, boarding axes,
blunderbusses and cutlasses, I came up with a
variation of the World War II Combined Operations
patch. I replaced the more substantial rounded
flukes of a ship's type anchor with the sharper
pronged Danforth that we used on small boats to
symbolize small craft. The Thompson submachine gun,
an American design used by Americans (Postal
Inspectors, Marines and the Coast Guard) far in
advance of British Commandos symbolized the
unconventional warfare aspects as well as heavier
firepower we brought on board and tended to have
afloat. There was no need for the eagle to symbolize
the air component because TOC was at the sharp edge
of the waterborne cutlass. The "0" above stood for
operator. I thought at some point if the design ever
caught on, and TOC operators were involved in a
shooting war that they could have a red embroidered
“0” for a combat veteran. I made these up and
purchased a small number maybe 25-50 for my crew and
others who helped or influenced me like GMCM Jim
Gray. The patch is black thread on olive green
approx 2 ½ inches x 2 ½ inches.
2.
Operation Jaywick and Rimau: Operation Jaywick was
perhaps the most daring and successful commando raid
of the Second World War. A captured Japanese fishing
boat motored thousands of miles into and out of
enemy waters to launch a canoe borne operators on a
limpeteer attack of the shipping in Singapore Harbor
sinking thousands of tons of enemy shipping with out
a single loss; unlike the far more famous Cockle
Shell Heroes raid by Royal Marines on Bordeaux
Harbor. While the former is a text book success, the
latter was an ill conceived suicide run. Both should
be studied by all waterborne special operations
forces as should Operation Rimau. Rimau was even
more fantastic than Jaywick and conceived by the
same core group; however bad luck and an unkept
rendezvous by their supporting submarine cost all
the men their lives. For further reading the most
accurate books on Jaywick and Raimu are Karit,
the Fishing boat that Went to War and The
Heroes of Rimau by Lynett Silver; though
Return of the Tiger and The Heroes first
piqued my interest.
2.
Levant Schooner Flotilla: The British supplied Greek
guerrillas, launched and recovered raiding parties
and operatives as well as collected intelligence
using a fleet of native schooners, caques, manned by
Royal Navy Sailors primarily sailing out of neutral
Turkish waters as well as Syria and Palestine during
the Second World War. A must read book is Adrian
Seligman's War in the Islands.
3.
American Colonial Ranger by Gary Zaboly.
Rodger's Rangers and other colonial scouting/war
parties used canoes as well as coastal, lake and
river craft for raiding and scouting in north
America before the American Revolution. Another
excellent book on Rodger's Rangers is White
Devil, True Story of War Savagery and Vengeance in
Colonial America by Stephen Bramwell.
Additionally, landing parties, prize crews and
cutting out parties were part and parcel of maritime
actions in the age of fighting sail.
4.
Riverine by Jim Mesko gives a nice pictorial
overview of riverene operations during the French
and American wars in Vietnam and shows some of the
junks and sampans by US and Vietnamese sailors not
to mention North Vietnamese combatants who used
everything from dug outs and sampans to fishing
trawlers for raiding, re-supply and mine laying.
5.
“Sparks in the Wilderness”. by Phil G. Garn
6.
“SOC” by James Gray GMCM ret.
7.
In the 1980's, Tom Clancey's techno thrillers were
all the rage and reflected the Eurocentric stance
adopted by the US. Despite the conventional actions
with lots of SF involvement in Grenada and Panama
much less the Mayaguez or Central American
conflicts, it was widely believed that "the real
war" was going to be a direct head to head repeat of
W.W.II with the Soviets and WARSAW PACT in Europe as
depicted in General Hackett's World War III
or one of Tom Clancey's novels, not these
reoccurring side shows.
8.
It was common place for reserves to buy and/or use
own equipment not to mention spend large amounts of
un-paid, non credited time to provide training
opportunities for their units. A lot of issue was
outdated some going back to W.W.II and primitive at
best. It was not just the SOC/TOC folks, but CDR's
Rick Gray and John Higgs would both use personal
cell phones to clear ranges and go hot in the 1980's
when the radios did not work [these were the big
shoe box sized ones]. Often the reserves would leap
ahead of active technology, such as adopting Gortex
foul weather gear, Patagonia fleece, using cell
phones or even jet skis. I still have set of Gortex
foul weather gear in Woodland Cammo from the 1980's
that I bought from Cabella's.
9.
Duncan Smith was then in graduate school at UCLA
getting his MBA when his class had been challenged
to a paint ball game by I think the class ahead. In
preparation for this contest, Duncan arranged a
training class with Dave Maynard out at his spread
in Alpine, CA and invited me along. Here I got an
other shot at what I had just learned at 32nd Street
on a land environment with men and women who had "no"
military background. Again, in the course of a day,
Duncan's class had bounded light years ahead of
their opponents and went on to decimate their
classmates. A plan, training (rehearsal) and
confidence goes a very, very long way.
10. The array of Blue forces was quite impressive
and included: Air assets - USN LAMPS MK-II, USCG
HC-130's and HC-25's performing aerial
reconnaissance, USCG HH-25's for recon and reaction
as well as LAPD and Sheriffs' Department Bell Jet
Rangers and H-500's. Sea assets - USS George
Phillip, USCG Point Carew, USCG Point
Evans, USCG Conifer, 82 and 42 foot
cutters, Sea Rider RIB's as well as Customs and DEA
craft for detection and inspection. Land assets
included USCG active and auxiliary personnel, MIUW
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare) Unit-105 (who was
using the then new ANSQR-17 for the first time) EOD
Mobil Unit 3 with Mk-VI assets (dolphins), LAPD,
Sheriffs Department, DEA Customs and harbor
personnel and assets for detection and protection.
11. In 2007, I was on a really that a set record for
swimming around Catalina Island and we left the same
dock area where our TOC rendezvoused with the
Crazy Baby . I got goose bumps flashing back to
17 years earlier to how we had run Al Qaeda like
missions from this very spot.
12. While the Coast Guard Auxiliary represents the
very best a TOC or any special operations crew could
expect for friendly agents and assets, US patriots
who are top flight sailors with outstanding local
knowledge and well maintained craft in super
condition; it is better to plan for the worst,
friendly agents who are not friendly in an
unfriendly environment. This type of operating is
way behind the lines and ultra ruse de guerre, so it
is highly unlikely that the opposition is going to
do anything other than torture you to death, so you
must plan for the worst at any point along your
route. It is literally do or die horribly. Even with
the CGA folks who were tops, we had to plan for a
quick takeover at any point in time and E&E
immediately. This needs to be part of the operators
mission planning from square one and along the route
until out of the danger area (back to friendly
base).
13. ASDV: These were tired heavy landing craft (LCU)
which had been converted to support diving
operations with a crane that could lift an SDV
(swimmer delivery vehicle, mini submarine) and a
re-compression chamber. They were so slow that it
was nearly impossible to steam (hold formation) with
them in any weather for any appreciable distance.
Their top speed was just above most boat's idle in
the Squadron.
14. Wayback: From the Fractured Fairy Tails cartoon
"Wayback Machine" - getting off track talking about
other operations and folks in the community.
Skippers were usually experienced handling mad men
because, they had been a mad man in their
operational days which is what you found out in the
Wayback.
15. This sort of nonsense is something you could
hardly tolerate even in training. In the real world,
this would be eliminated see note 12 above.
16. Fixing PAR-X-ALLANCE : Here was a real
example of how skilled the guys were especially Mac.
The hours they put in would have cost the CGA
captain hundreds of dollars (out of his own pocket)
and went a long way to building a bond with our CGA
comrades who would have no doubt provided a source
of “indigenous craft” for future training
evolutions, had the war not intervened.
17. HSB's (high speed boats): The first HSB's were
civilian ocean racers produced by Setton purchased
by Seal Team-6. We (SBR-1) inherited them after
Team-6 had given them a good thrashing
operationally, including paradrops. They were not
really well suited to Spec Ops, but a good start. I
remember riding them out at San Clemente on a final
battle problem and they would beat you to death. At
any speed in sea above glass, the only comfortable
spot was at the helm. The weapons stations though a
jury rigged after thought were slightly better than
the Sea Fox, but equally ineffective at speed.
18. Tom and I along with Jay Duenas, Bob Cantwell
and Brad Hackett had supported SEAL ambushes of
SBU-11 boats up in the Sacramento River Delta during
a previous ACDUTRA. We learned from them not only
the up gunning, using the 7.62mm weapons versus
5.56mm but also some patrolling for infil to exfil
including E&E. Spec War would hold on to M-14's
while other services gave up the big weapons, which
recently made a big comeback in Afghanistan. Though
a bear, especially on full auto, the M-14 was much
better gun with longer range and more knock down and
penetration than the M-16. As much as we envied the
CAR-15's and MP-5's, the shot gun M-203 and M-14
were much more of a staple in the Squadron at that
time. We were also happy with the M-60E's as
dismounted weapons, though the Stoner was a mighty
fun little fire hose and would eventually be
replaced by the SAW. Pistols in the inventory ranged
from the trusty .45’s to decrepit .38’s though the
9mm SIG’s came in for a while.
Photos: I know I took a number of
photos from the MARDEZ exercise and the ambush,
developed them and passed out the prints, but these
and the negatives were lost in the shuffle. If
anyone has copies, please get them to me. It would
be greatly appreciated.
|
